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Abstract 
Procedural priming refers to how the frequent or recent use of certain cognitive procedures on one task can lead to a 
greater propensity to use the same procedures on a subsequent task. In this paper, we demonstrate how procedural 
priming may be used to assess spontaneous inference formation in situations where the inference involves a 
relationship or rule. We do so in the context of the advertising cost–product quality rule, i.e., that “higher advertising 
expense implies higher product quality.” Prior research suggests that underlying the advertising cost–quality rule is a 
basic human attribution (the effort investment rule) that says, if someone invests a lot of effort in a cause, it implies 
a true belief in that cause. We prime the effort investment rule in an interpersonal context and show that this affects 
spontaneous generation of the advertising cost–quality rule in an advertising context. 
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1. Procedural priming effects on spontaneous inference formation 
There is a good deal of research in psychology and marketing on how priming increases the accessibility of 
constructs or concepts. Priming a construct has been shown to affect interpretation or categorization of ambiguous 
behavior (e.g. Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1980), 
assimilation/contrast of evaluative judgments (e.g. Herr, 1989; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983), and the readiness 
with which the same concept or a related one is perceived (e.g. Eich, 1984; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982). 
An additional effect of priming occurs from procedural priming (Higgins, 1989), or the priming of cognitive 
procedures. A cognitive procedure may be thought of as a set of cognitive operations that characterize the 
performance of a particular task. In other words, it represents the `how' of task performance in cognitive terms. 
Procedural priming arises when the frequent or recent use of certain cognitive procedures increases the propensity to 
use the same procedures on a subsequent task (Smith & Branscombe, 1987). For example, Higgins and Chaires 
(1980) used procedural priming to help subjects solve the Duncker (1945) candle problem. The problem required 
subjects to attach a candle to a wall to provide light, given the following items – a candle, a box of thumbtacks, and 
matches. Because the points of the tacks were not sufficiently long to go through the candle, the only solution to the 
problem was to attach the box to the wall using a tack and then to attach the candle to the box. Subjects in one prime 
condition were shown pictures of objects that were described with phrases that contained “of” (e.g. “tray of 
tomatoes”), while in another prime condition, the same objects were described with phrases that contained “and” 
(e.g. “tray and tomatoes”). The authors found that, within the same time interval, 20% of subjects in the former 
condition and 80% in the latter solved the problem. Hence, it appears that because the “and” prime condition 
involved the use of cognitive procedures that were compatible with solving the problem, the persistent use of the 
same cognitive procedures when thinking about the problem facilitated problem solution. Similar effects have been 
reported in the area of social cognition. Fenigstein and Levine (1984), for instance, showed that subjects asked to 
generate self-referent sentences in a priming phase were more likely to make internal rather than external 
attributions on a subsequent task, compared to subjects who were asked to generate other-referent sentences. Bassili 
(1993) found that subjects who had earlier practiced behavior–trait inferencing were more likely to generate 
spontaneous trait inferences upon later encountering behavior descriptions. 
Smith and his colleagues (Smith & Branscombe, 1987; Smith, Branscombe, & Bormann, 1988; Smith & Lerner, 
1986) have theorized that such effects can be explained in terms of the ACT* model (Anderson, 1983). The model 
posits that cognitive procedures can be represented as productions in the form of `if–then' pairs. Information that one 
encounters may be compared against the `if' component of a production held in memory. If a match results, the 
action to be performed is described by the `then' component of the production. Smith asserts that repeated use of the 
production speeds up the pattern match process and increases the likelihood that the productions will be executed. 
Furthermore, this process should not be content-specific; rather, it should generalize to new tasks so long as the 
same productions are involved (Smith & Lerner, 1986). 
Although procedural priming has been used in psychology, it has not been applied in a marketing context, despite its 
potential as a managerial tool for inducing favorable product inferences. Consumers often make inferences about 
products, particularly when faced with incomplete information or when uncertainty about an attribute is present. For 
instance, consumers may draw product quality inferences based on a number of specific attributes, such as price 
(Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994b), warranty (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993; Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994a), brand name (Rao, 
Qu, & Ruekert, 1999) and advertising expenditures (Kirmani & Wright, 1989). Similarly, consumers may draw 
inferences from omitted conclusions (Kardes, 1988) as well as inferences of benefits/functions from attributes (Lee 
& Olshavsky, 1995). 
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Procedural priming can potentially influence the likelihood of consumers' making such inferences spontaneously, 
i.e., without conscious intention. To the extent that consumers draw product inferences of their own accord and 
without conscious intention, consumers are less likely to engage in counter-arguments or experience skepticism 
about the information. Hence, procedural priming may generate more favorable inferences about a company 
compared to more explicit procedures. 
In this paper, we demonstrate how procedural priming may be used to assess spontaneous inference formation in 
situations where the inference involves a relationship or rule. We do so in the context of the advertising cost–product 
quality rule, i.e., that “higher advertising expense implies higher product quality” (Kirmani & Wright, 1989). 
According to this rule, consumers associate highly advertised brands with high quality products. Although research 
has shown that consumers use this rule in a variety of contexts (e.g. Kirmani, 1990 and Kirmani, 1997), there is no 
evidence that the inference may be spontaneous. If anything, prior work suggests that the rule is not well-practiced 
and that the inference is unlikely to be spontaneous (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994b). 
In the next section, we discuss current measures of spontaneity and describe how procedural priming may be used to 
assess the spontaneity of the advertising–quality inference. We then present some hypotheses, followed by a study to 
test our predictions. We conclude with implications for further research. 
 
2. Spontaneity of inference 
An inference is thought to be spontaneous when it occurs without explicit prompting and often without conscious 
intention (Newman & Uleman, 1989; Winter & Uleman, 1984). Much of the research in spontaneous inferencing 
has been in the domain of inferring personality traits. It has been shown, for example, that subjects spontaneously 
infer traits upon reading descriptions of trait-implying behavior, despite not being told to do so and despite a lack of 
awareness of having done so (e.g. Duff & Newman, 1997; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 
1985). For instance, a trait such as “clever” may be spontaneously inferred from a behavior such as “The secretary 
solves the mystery halfway through the book.” 
How then does one ascertain if a spontaneous inference has been made? The making of an inference can have at 
least three effects: (1) it can make the inferred construct or attribute more accessible in memory; (2) depending on 
the favorability or unfavorability of the inferred construct or attribute, it can affect the evaluation of the object to 
which the inference is directed; and (3) it can make the inferred construct an effective retrieval cue for that which 
originally prompted the inference. Consider a job candidate who has the distinction of being a member of the 
organization, Mensa. On encountering this information, an interviewer might spontaneously infer that the candidate 
is intelligent. Having made that inference, the attribute intelligent is likely to become accessible in memory, and 
given the desirability of intelligence in an employee, the interviewer is likely to be more positively disposed to the 
job candidate than if the inference had not been made. After a day of interviews, when the interviewer attempts to 
recall the various candidates he has seen, the word intelligent is likely to serve as an effective retrieval cue for the 
recall of this particular candidate and the fact that he was a member of Mensa. 
Based on this logic, tests for spontaneous inference making have included measures of accessibility of the inferred 
construct, such as word-stem completion tasks (Whitney, Waring, & Zingmark, 1992), lexical-decision tasks (Zarate, 
Uleman, & Voils, 2001), reaction time tasks (Kardes, 1988; Stayman & Kardes, 1992), product choice (Broniarczyk 
& Alba, 1994a; Dick, Chakravarti, & Biehal, 1990), and cued-recall tasks (Duff & Newman, 1997; Winter & 
Uleman, 1984). Common to these various methods is that they offer indirect evidence that an inference has been 
made. This is in contrast to directly measuring the inference, such as by having the interviewer evaluate the 
intelligence of the job candidate. 
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The reason for relying on an indirect measure is that a direct measure might prompt an inference that would 
otherwise not have been made. That is, the inference might merely be the result of the measure, thereby hampering 
the derivation of any firm conclusions about spontaneity. However, indirect measures also have drawbacks. First, 
one cannot have absolute confidence that the construct or attribute in question was indeed inferred, and not some 
closely related construct or attribute. For instance, in the previous example, the interviewer might have inferred that 
the Mensa job candidate is nerdy (rather than intelligent). Since intelligence is closely associated with nerdiness, the 
intelligence construct might still be found to be accessible even though it was not inferred at the time. Second, not 
measuring the inference directly also prevents one from ascertaining the valence of the inference (e.g. the level of 
judged quality). 
One way around these drawbacks is to measure the inference directly, while at the same time gathering indirect 
evidence for spontaneity. In the context of a product quality inference, for instance, this is done by measuring 
evaluations of product quality as well as the time taken to formulate that evaluation.1 The rationale for measuring 
response times is as follows: Say a subject has inferred that a product is of high quality on being exposed to an ad 
for it. When subsequently queried about his perception of the product's quality, he would be able to simply retrieve 
his earlier judgment rather than have to compute one. Since retrieval operations are believed to be less cognitively 
demanding than computational operations, response times will be quicker if a spontaneous inference had been made 
(Kardes, 1988). 
In the next section, we describe how procedural priming may be used to assess spontaneity of the advertising–
quality inference. 
 
3. Procedural priming and the advertising–quality inference 
The advertising cost–quality rule is less practiced than other quality-related rules, such as “high price implies high 
quality.” For instance, Kirmani (1990) found that although subjects' quality judgments when exposed to expensive 
advertising reflected the use of the cost–quality rule, few subjects were able to verbalize the use of the rule. 
Similarly, Broniarczyk and Alba (1994b) demonstrated a low reliance on the advertising cost–quality rule when 
advertising cost information was provided along with price, despite covariation evidence in the data favoring an 
advertising cost–quality inference rule over a price–quality inference rule. 
One way to make the rule more accessible would be to prime it, such as by exposing subjects to information that 
explicitly confirmed the correlation between advertising costs and product quality. Such a prime was used in 
Kirmani and Wright (1989) in the form of a magazine article that discussed the relationship between ad costs and 
product quality. Although such a prime accomplishes the intent of making the ad cost–quality relationship accessible, 
as mentioned earlier, its explicitness or lack of subtlety leads to concerns about potential demand effects and perhaps 
even counter-arguing on the part of subjects, especially if the message is perceived to be a persuasive 
communication. 
Therefore, a procedural prime may be more appropriate. Previous research suggests that repeated use of a cognitive 
procedure on one task can lead to a greater propensity to use the same procedure and greater efficiency in using it on 
a subsequent task. Moreover, the new task need not bear the same specific content as the prime task for effects to be 
observed. Rather, the effects can generalize to new content provided the same cognitive procedures are applicable 
(Bassili, 1993; Smith et al., 1988; Smith & Lerner, 1986). In the case of behavior–trait inferences, for instance, the 
two tasks need not involve the same behaviors or inference of the same traits. What is primed are the general 
cognitive operations involved in making trait inferences from behaviors. 
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In the context of the advertising cost–quality rule, this suggests that the exact form or context of the prime need not 
be couched in terms of advertising or quality. As long as the cognitive operations underlying the inference rule are 
primed, inference formation ought to be facilitated. The advertising cost–quality rule involves perceptions about the 
amount of effort an advertiser is expending in promoting the product (Kirmani & Wright, 1989). Perceived 
advertising effort is thought to be indicative of a company's confidence or belief in the product's quality and sales 
potential, thereby mediating the advertising cost–product quality relationship (Kirmani, 1990). Abstracted from the 
context, the inference rule may be described as one that says, if a person is observed to have put in a substantial 
amount of effort into a particular undertaking, then it must be that he/she believes the undertaking to be a 
worthwhile one. We label this the effort investment rule. 
The effort investment rule derives from an attribution process whereby one makes an inference about an 
unobservable characteristic of a person (e.g. belief in the value of an undertaking) based on the person's observable 
behavior (e.g. investment of effort in the undertaking). Attribution research (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; 
Kelly, 1967) has shown that there is a tendency for people to go beyond the information given to infer a cause for 
someone else's behavior, and this research has identified the rules and logic that appear to govern the manner in 
which these inferences are made. For instance, Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal (1978) show that consumers may 
infer how much they like a product based on whether they paid full price or bought the product on deal. The more 
they paid, the greater the inferred liking. The effort investment rule is similar in that the belief that a company has 
expended a good deal of effort in a particular undertaking leads to the attribution that the company must believe in 
the value of the undertaking. 
Based on procedural priming, we suggest that priming the effort investment rule will affect advertising cost–quality 
inferencing by increasing its spontaneity. For instance, describing the effort expended by an individual in an 
interpersonal context (e.g. contribution to charity) is likely to facilitate the advertising cost–quality inference during 
subsequent exposure to advertising cost information for a target product. Thus, priming in an interpersonal context 
will affect inferences made in a marketing context. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
To illustrate the applicability of procedural priming in our context, we consider a situation in which consumers make 
quality judgments after reading about a new product and the advertising costs associated with its introduction. To 
assess spontaneity, we vary the type of prime and the cognitive capacity at the time of judgment. Since retrieval 
operations are believed to require less cognitive capacity than computational operations, constraining cognitive 
capacity at judgment should slow responses to a greater degree when computation rather than retrieval is involved 
(Kardes, 1988). 
The prime may be facilitative or suppressive, or there may be no prime. A facilitative prime is one that makes 
accessible cognitive procedures that are presumed to underlie the desired inference rule. A suppressive prime makes 
accessible cognitive procedures that suppress later use of the inference rule, e.g., by making salient competing 
attributions. 
In our context, the facilitative prime makes accessible the inference rule that high investment of effort implies belief 
in the worthiness of an undertaking. The suppressive prime, in contrast, makes a competing inference rule – high 
investment of effort implies potential for personal gain – more accessible, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the 
effort investment rule will be used on a subsequent task. 
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We propose that spontaneous inferencing will occur in the facilitative prime condition only; however, quality ratings 
will be as favorable in the facilitative prime condition as in the no prime condition. Kirmani and Wright (1989) 
found that subjects in a no prime condition were just as likely to infer high quality from high advertising expense, as 
subjects in a prime condition that affirmed the tenability of the ad cost–quality relationship. In other words, it 
appears that people do make high quality inferences based on high advertising expense even without the aid of a 
prime, such that the presence of a prime does not boost inference use and quality ratings significantly. (However, it 
does not mean that the inference is spontaneous.) Thus, the facilitative prime may not lead to significantly greater 
use of the inference relative to the no prime condition. In contrast, we expect that the suppressive prime will lead to 
a lower incidence of use of the ad cost–quality inference given that it primes a competing attribution. This leads us 
to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: 
Compared to a no prime condition, a facilitative prime (which primes the effort investment rule) will lead to 
equivalent product quality perceptions that are no different. 
H1b: 
Compared to a facilitative prime or no prime condition, a suppressive prime (which primes a competing attribution) 
will lead to less favorable product quality perceptions. 
Because subjects are expected to compute a quality judgment in the no prime and suppressive prime conditions and 
to retrieve a quality judgment in the facilitative prime condition, the imposition of a concurrent memory task at 
judgment is likely to affect the speed of quality judgments differentially across priming conditions. Specifically, the 
facilitative prime is expected to lead to greater spontaneous inferencing at the time of encoding, which, in turn, 
allows for a simple retrieval of that inference at time of quality judgment. The suppressive and no prime conditions, 
however, involve the computation of a quality judgment. Therefore, constraining cognitive capacity at judgment is 
expected to slow responses dramatically and to a larger extent in the no prime and suppressive prime conditions 
compared to the facilitative prime condition. This suggests an interaction between the level of cognitive capacity and 
the type of priming. 
H2a: 
Constraining cognitive capacity at the time of quality judgment in the facilitative prime condition will slow 
responses to a lesser extent than will constraining cognitive capacity in the suppressive prime or no prime condition. 
H2b: 
Constraining cognitive capacity at time of quality judgment in the suppressive prime condition will slow responses 
to the same extent as constraining cognitive capacity in the no prime condition. 
 
To reiterate the logic behind the above hypotheses, on reading that a company has invested a large sum in 
advertising a target product, a subject in the facilitative prime condition (in contrast to one in the no prime or 
suppressive prime conditions) would be likely to spontaneously infer that the product is of high quality. Given that a 
quality judgment has already been made, the subject will simply retrieve that judgment when subsequently asked to 
evaluate product quality. Since retrieving a judgment is not as cognitively demanding as computing one ( Kardes, 
1988), the subject in the facilitative prime condition will be slowed to a smaller extent when his/her cognitive 
capacity is constrained as compared to a subject in the no prime or suppressive prime conditions. 
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Next, we describe an experiment designed to test these hypotheses. 
 
5. Experiment 
5.1. Design 
The study was a 3 (Prime: no prime vs. facilitative prime vs. suppressive prime) × 2 (cognitive capacity at judgment: 
low vs. high) between subjects design. The facilitative prime condition primed the effort investment rule, while the 
suppressive prime scenario made salient an alternative motive (personal gain) as the reason for the expended effort. 
All three prime groups were exposed to the same high advertising cost information for a fictitious product. Also, 
approximately half the subjects in each prime condition made product quality judgments under conditions of 
constrained cognitive resources brought about by a concurrent memory load task. Quality judgments and the time 
taken to respond on the judgment task served as the dependent measures. 
 
5.2. Independent variables 
The prime was a scenario that described a charitable donation of time and money (i.e., effort) and varied whether the 
underlying reason for the effort was an intrinsic belief in the charity or something external. In the facilitative prime 
scenario, the donor was a woman who gave a larger amount of money to Habitat for Humanity than to other 
charities, and there were no external reasons stated or implied for the donation. Hence, the inference should be that 
the woman truly believed in the cause. Specifically, subjects read that “Marian typically gives about $25 each to a 
number of different charities. To Habitat for Humanity (a nonprofit organization that builds houses for less well off 
people), she gives a much bigger donation. And she attends Habitat for Humanity events one weekend a month in 
her hometown.” 
In the suppressive prime scenario, an external (noneffort) reason for the donation was implied. Specifically, the 
scenario stated that “Marian typically gives about $25 each to a number of different charities. A man she's interested 
in works for Habitat for Humanity (a nonprofit organization that builds houses for less well off people). Marian 
gives a much bigger donation to Habitat for Humanity. And she attends Habitat for Humanity events one weekend a 
month in her hometown.” The alternative reason for the charity is personal gain, i.e., impressing a man. Finally, in 
the no prime condition, subjects did not see a description of charitable donations. 
Cognitive capacity at judgment was manipulated using a concurrent task of digit rehearsal (Johnston, Greenberg, 
Fisher, & Martin, 1970; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1984). Subjects were asked to remember a series of seven 
digits that were flashed on the screen at the rate of one-half second per digit. They were told that, at some point, they 
would be asked to recall the exact order of the digits. In order to improve memory, they were advised to keep 
repeating the numbers to themselves. This manipulation of cognitive capacity occurred at judgment, i.e., when 
subjects were asked to assess quality, rather than at the time product information was presented. Subjects with high 
cognitive capacity did not have a concurrent task and were free to devote their full cognitive resources to evaluating 
the product's quality. 
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5.3. Pretests 
A pretest on 76 undergraduates at a large North American university drawn from the same population as the main 
study demonstrated that the primes were successful in leading subjects to the intended attributions of effort. Subjects 
saw either the facilitative prime scenario or the suppressive prime scenario and then responded to the following two 
questions: (1) how much does Marian truly believe in Habitat for Humanity’s cause? (1=not at all, 6=very much); 
and (2) compared to other charities, how important is Habitat for Humanity to Marian? (1=not at all important; 
6=extremely important). The responses were averaged across the two items (r=0.68). The mean in the facilitative 
prime condition (X=5.74) was significantly different from that of the suppressive prime condition (X=4.04; 
t(74)=8.41, p<0.0001), suggesting that the manipulation was successful. Thus, the facilitative prime scenario 
conveyed the notion that exerting extra effort indicates an intrinsic belief in a cause, while the suppressive prime 
scenario suggested that the reasons for the extra effort may be something other than an intrinsic belief in a cause. 
A second pretest assessed whether the primes affected mood. A possible confound could be that the facilitative 
prime may make people happier (since it depicts generosity), while the suppressive prime may make people feel 
skeptical or discouraged and that these differences could affect quality perceptions. Thus, we compared the two 
primes on a variety of mood measures, including skeptical, happy, sad, angry, interested, hopeful, afraid and 
discouraged. Thirty-two additional subjects from the same undergraduate population participated in the pretest in 
which they responded to these scales after reading one of the two scenarios. There were no significant differences 
across the two groups in terms of their mood after reading the scenarios (all Fs <1.4). Therefore, the primes are 
equivalent on mood. 
A final pretest was conducted on a separate undergraduate sample to ensure that the cost cue to be used in the 
description of the target product would have the intended effects on quality perceptions. To do that, one group of 
subjects was given the description with the cost cue of $10 million while another was given the same description but 
with the cost cue excluded. Subjects then rated the product on quality, price and the amount of effort the company 
had invested in promoting the product on seven-point scales (1=very low/very inexpensive/very little effort, 7=very 
high/very expensive/a lot of effort). The results indicated that quality perceptions were more favorable with the $10 
million cue at a marginally significant level (X=4.75 vs. X=4.25, t(46)=1.56, p<0.06). There was no significant 
difference in price perceptions between the two conditions (p>0.4), thus providing assurance that the difference in 
quality judgments was not due to differing price perceptions. Finally, subjects in the $10 million cost cue condition 
rated effort invested as higher (X=5.5 vs. X=4.38, t(46)=3.12, p<0.01). Hence, subjects inferred marginally higher 
product quality and thought the company invested greater effort in promoting the product when provided with 
advertising cost information. 
 
5.4. Procedure 
Subjects were 84 undergraduates from a large North American university who participated in a study for course 
credit in a Marketing class. On arrival, subjects were randomly assigned across treatments and were told that they 
were about to participate in a survey that solicited their opinion on a variety of issues that were not related to each 
other. The entire study was done on computer and run individually. The target product was a hypothetical new 
beverage called Quest. 
Before proceeding with the first task, subjects were warned that they would not be able to change their responses 
once they had made them and hence, they should endeavor to be reasonably sure of themselves before making a 
response. These instructions were intended to yield greater uniformity in the decision criteria used by subjects. 
 
Procedural priming effects on spontaneous inference formation Page 9 
 
The first task was a practice trial. Its purpose was to minimize variability in response latency by giving subjects 
practice with key press responses and to familiarize subjects with the digit rehearsal task. They were first given a 
description of a hypothetical product (Frazz potato chips), followed by instructions for performing the digit rehearsal 
task. The seven digits were then flashed, one at a time, on the computer screen. While holding these digits in mind, 
they responded to various questions pertaining to the product. Finally, they were asked to report the seven digits. 
This completed the practice trial. 
The priming task was administered next. Subjects in the two prime conditions received the prime scenario, followed 
by the same two questions used in the pretest. These served as manipulation checks. Subjects in the no prime 
condition went on to the next task. All subjects then completed a filler task comprising a series of five trivia 
questions. 
Subjects then read a description of Quest bottled water and were shown a sample print ad for the product. For 
subjects in the low cognitive capacity condition, instructions for the digit rehearsal task were then reiterated before a 
different set of seven digits was flashed on the screen. These subjects then judged the quality of the product and 
evaluated the effort invested by the company in promoting the product, while holding the digits in mind. Following 
that, they were asked to report the digits. Subjects in the high cognitive capacity condition were asked to judge the 
quality of the product and the effort invested by the company immediately following presentation of the product 
description and sample ad. 
All subjects then responded to measures of the perceived advertising expenditure for the product and questions 
relating to their demographic profile. The entire study took 30 minutes. 
 
5.5. Stimuli 
The description of Quest contained information about its recent introduction in the US. The product was described 
as a sparkling spring water with real juice that was “completely quenching in muggy weather.” In addition, subjects 
were told that the product was priced competitively with other bottled waters, sold in convenience stores and 
supermarkets, and had a $10 million introductory ad campaign. Hence, the description contained information about 
the product's attributes, its price, the distribution strategy for the product, as well as the advertising cost. A separate 
pretest on a sample of subjects from the same pool of university students revealed that the average perceived 
advertising spending for the category was $7.2 million, an amount significantly lower than $10 million. 
Finally, the advertisement for Quest showed bottles of the beverage with the tag line “Introducing Strawberry and 
Lemon/Lime.” 
 
5.6. Measures 
5.6.1. Dependent measures 
Both quality perceptions and response times were collected. Quality perceptions were measured with a question that 
asked what subjects thought about the overall quality of the product relative to other brands of bottled water. They 
responded on a seven-point scale (1=very low and 7=very high). Response time for the quality judgment was 
measured from the time the question was presented to the time a keypress was made. 
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5.6.2. Confound check 
To ensure that perceptions of campaign cost were equivalent across conditions, perceived advertising cost was 
measured as the average of three seven-point scales (very low/high; too little/much; below/above average; 
Cronbach's alpha=0.78). Subjects were asked what they thought about the amount of money spent on advertising the 
product, compared to other bottled water products. 
 
5.7. Results 
5.7.1. Manipulation check 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA using only the two primed conditions revealed a significant main effect of Prime on subjects' 
ratings of Marian's belief in the cause [F(1,49)=16.95, p<0.0001]. There were no other significant effects. Marian's 
actions were judged as more reflective of a true belief in the charity by subjects in the facilitative prime condition 
(X=5.80) than by subjects in the suppressive prime condition (X=4.64). This suggests that the prime was more likely 
to lead subjects to attribute effort to belief in the cause in the facilitative prime condition than in the suppressive 
prime condition. Hence, the manipulation was successful. 
 
5.7.2. Perceived costs 
There were no significant treatment effects on perceived costs. The sample mean was 4.39, suggesting that the level 
of perceived costs could not account for differences in quality judgments. See Table 1 for cell means. 
Table 1. Mean quality ratings, perceived costs and quality response times as a function of prime and cognitive 
capacity 
       
 
Facilitative prime Suppressive prime No prime 
 
Low cognitive 
capacity 
High 
cognitive 
capacity 
Low  
cognitive 
capacity 
High 
cognitive 
capacity 
Low  
cognitive 
capacity 
High 
cognitive 
capacity 
Quality rating 5.5 5.55 4.5 4.58 5.44 5.38 
Perceived costs 4.4 4.64 3.88 4.17 4.48 4.9 
Quality response time(s) 11.8 11.92 20.56 12.34 20.59 11.66 
Note: All ratings are on seven-point scales. 
5.7.3. Quality ratings 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that quality perceptions should be equivalent in the facilitative prime condition compared to 
the no prime condition (Hypothesis 1a); and lower in the suppressive prime condition compared to either the 
facilitative prime or no prime condition (Hypothesis 1b). Thus, a main effect of Prime is predicted. Moreover, we 
expect the average of the quality perceptions of those in the facilitative and no prime conditions to be significantly 
greater than those in the suppressive prime condition. 
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A 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Prime [F(2,78)=10.43, p<0.001] on the perceived quality of 
Quest. There were no other significant effects. As expected, quality perceptions were more favorable in the 
facilitative prime and no prime conditions than in the suppressive prime condition [Xfacilitative prime= 5.52,  
Xsuppressive prime= 4.54, Xno prime= 5.42; ((Xfacilitative prime + Xno prime ) / 2) vs. Xsuppressive prime : F(1,78)= 16.61 , p<0.0001;  
Xno prime vs. Xsuppressive prime : F(1,78) = 20.82, p<0.0001]. The facilitative prime and no prime conditions were not 
significantly different [F<1]. This is consistent with the notion that the suppressive prime suppressed inference use, 
leading to less favorable beliefs than in the other two conditions. In addition, the equivalence of the no prime and 
facilitative prime conditions suggests that subjects, when asked to make a quality judgment, do rely on advertising 
cost cues even when they are not primed to do so. Thus, Hypothesis 1a and b are supported. 
 
5.7.4. Quality response times 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an interaction effect between Prime and Cognitive Capacity on quality response times. A 3 × 
2 ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Prime [F(2,78)=3.22, p<0.05] and Cognitive Capacity 
[F(1,78)=12.50, p<0.0007] and a significant interaction effect [F(2,78)=3.14, p<0.05] on the response times for 
quality ratings. Planned comparisons revealed that response times in the suppressive prime and no prime conditions 
were significantly slower when cognitive capacity was low than high [Suppressive prime: Xhigh=12.34, 
Xlow=20.56:F(1,78)=8.81, p<0.004; No Prime: Xhigh=11.66, Xlow=20.59:F(1,78)=11.44, p<0.001]. In the facilitative 
prime condition, however, response times were equivalent across cognitive capacity conditions, suggesting that low 
capacity subjects had spontaneously generated a quality inference [Xhigh=11.92, Xlow=11.80; F<1]. These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2a and b. 
In addition, under low cognitive capacity, response times were faster in the facilitative prime condition relative to 
the other two prime conditions [Xfacilitative prime= 11.80, Xsuppressive prime= 20.56, Xno prime= 20.59;  
((Xsuppressive prime + Xno prime ) / 2) vs. Xfacilitative prime : F(1,78)= 14.51 , p<0.0003]. When cognitive capacity was high, 
there were no significant differences in response times across the prime conditions (all Fs <1). 
Overall, the pattern of response times is consistent with the notion that the ad cost–quality inference is not ordinarily 
a spontaneous one. It can, however, be spontaneous when the cognitive procedures mediating the inference are 
primed. 
 
6. Discussion 
The main objective of the paper was to demonstrate the usefulness of procedural priming as a way of assessing an 
inference's spontaneity when the inference involves a relationship or rule. Our data show that spontaneous 
inferencing can indeed be influenced by procedural priming. Specifically, we primed the cognitive procedures 
expected to mediate the ad cost–quality inference (i.e., the effort investment rule) and found evidence that subjects 
had made quality evaluations without being prompted to do so. This reinforces earlier conclusions that cognitions 
about the amount of effort expended mediate the effect of advertising costs on quality perceptions. 
One of the benefits of procedural priming was that it minimized the likelihood of demand effects. Since the prime 
was instantiated in an interpersonal rather than a marketing context, subjects would be unlikely to recognize the 
relationship between the prime and the subsequent task. A more direct prime, such as a magazine article informing 
subjects that ad costs and product quality are correlated (cf. Kirmani & Wright, 1989), could be argued to be more 
like a learning task, making assessment of spontaneity difficult. 
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The finding that priming an attribution of human behavior affects how consumers interpret a company's advertising 
expenditures is intriguing. It suggests that the ad cost–quality inference is not unique in itself, but is merely an 
instantiation of a more general attribution principle. This, in turn, implies that there may be instantiations of the 
principle in other contexts, such as when a politician goes the extra mile to endorse a particular candidate's bid for 
public office or when animal rights activists take extreme measures to rescue animals they consider to be abused. 
Moreover, this line of reasoning potentially explains the findings of Broniarczyk and Alba (1994b), who reported a 
low incidence of use of the ad cost–quality inference by subjects despite being presented with data that showed a 
high correlation between advertising expense and quality. Our findings suggest that the ad cost–quality inference 
may not originate from a perceived correlation between the two variables in the real world, but from a more general 
principle that says effort reflects one's belief. If it were derived from observations of correlation, one would expect 
the inference rule to be used in a domain-specific way, and its use would not be facilitated by procedural priming in 
a different domain. 
Other marketing contexts in which procedural priming may be useful to assess spontaneity include other inference 
rules, such as “higher warranty indicates greater durability” (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993), an unknown brand that is 
vulnerable to consumer sanctions must have high quality (Rao et al., 1999), and higher coupon values imply higher 
prices (Raghubir, 1998). In addition, procedural priming may be used in the case of teaser ads, in which the initial 
ads in a sequence of ads may serve as a procedural prime, increasing the likelihood that the subsequent ad(s) will be 
processed in a particular way. For example, one might use the initial ads in the sequence to prime the effort 
investment rule, by presenting scenarios wherein one's belief in a certain cause or undertaking leads him/her to 
devote substantial effort to it. The final ad in the sequence might then communicate to consumers that the company 
had gone to great advertising expense to introduce the benefits of the product to the market. An issue for further 
research is whether such procedural priming effects will survive the typical time lag between ads. 
Future research may also investigate the conditions under which procedural priming may generate spontaneous 
inferences. For instance, individual differences might moderate the findings reported here. Classic attribution theory 
makes the distinction between the attribution of behavior to situational causes and to internal dispositions (Heider, 
1958). People have different attributional styles, according to their tendency towards the former or the latter. In fact, 
it has been shown that Chinese students are more likely to explain events in terms of situational causes, unlike their 
American counterparts, who are more likely to explain them in terms of the actor's disposition (Morris & Peng, 
1994). In the present context, this suggests that consumers who favor situational explanations may be less likely to 
infer quality from advertising expense, since the effort investment rule that underlies the inference is one that 
assigns a dispositional cause (belief) to observed effort. In addition, procedural priming may be less successful at 
leading them to make spontaneous inferences of the type seen here. 
We demonstrated the applicability of procedural priming in a single context; therefore, caution should be exercised 
before generalizing these findings to other contexts. Clearly, these results await extension to other inference rules or 
other marketing contexts. Moreover, somewhat at odds with our hypotheses is the null effect of prime on response 
latency when cognitive capacity was high. If spontaneous inferencing had indeed occurred in the facilitative prime 
condition, one would expect that there would be gains in response time as a result of being able to retrieve the 
quality evaluation instead of having to compute one. We suggest that in the low cognitive capacity conditions, the 
predominant response would be to retrieve an evaluation if one existed given that subjects were severely constrained 
in terms of cognitive resources. The same is not true of subjects in the high cognitive capacity condition. Their 
cognitive resources were at their disposal and their options were not constrained to the retrieval of an existing 
evaluation. Hence, it is possible that subjects may have chosen to engage in more deliberative analysis to arrive at an 
evaluation in spite of one already existing in memory. This is especially likely if subjects were highly motivated in 
providing an assessment (a condition that may have been bolstered by having informed subjects that they would not 
be able to change their responses) or if they did not hold the existing evaluation with confidence (see Fazio, 1990). 
Since these variables were not measured, we can only speculate that these conditions may have been met given that 
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subjects were likely to have found the product to be personally relevant (beverage to be launched in US cities), and 
they may have been hesitant to rely on an evaluation formed by way of a simple inference. 
While consumers routinely go beyond the information they have about products by using a variety of inference rules, 
our understanding of these inference rules is far from complete. The findings reported here take us one step closer to 
a better understanding by demonstrating that priming the cognitive processes that underlie a rule may increase the 
likelihood that a spontaneous inference occurs. Future research may extend the findings of this paper and examine 
the value of procedural priming in generating spontaneous inferences in other contexts. 
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